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Abstract—Standard security protocols like SSL, TLS, IPSec
etc. have high memory and processor consumption which makes
all these security protocols unsuitable for resource constrained
platforms such as Internet of Things (IoT). Blockchain (BC) finds
its efficient application in IoT platform to preserve the five basic
cryptographic primitives, such as confidentiality, authenticity,
integrity, availability and non-repudiation. Conventional adoption
of BC in IoT platform causes high energy consumption, delay and
computational overhead which are not appropriate for various
resource constrained IoT devices. This work proposes a machine
learning (ML) based smart access control framework in a public
and a private BC for a smart city application which makes it
more efficient as compared to the existing IoT applications. The
proposed IoT based smart city architecture adopts BC technology
for preserving all the cryptographic security and privacy issues.
Moreover, BC has very minimal overhead on IoT platform
as well. This work investigates the existing threat models and
critical access control issues which handle multiple permissions
of various nodes and detects relevant inconsistencies to notify the
corresponding nodes. Comparison in terms of all security issues
with existing literature shows that the proposed architecture is
competitively efficient in terms of security access control.
Index Terms—IoT, Blockchain, Cryptography, Access control
& Smart City
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of communication technology, network
technology and increasing number of smart devices makes IoT
very relevant for research exploration. Conversely the existing
literature survey notices that IoT platform still suffers from
privacy and security vulnerabilities [1]. The centralized archi-
tecture and less resource availability in most of the IoT devices
have made the conventional security and privacy preserva-
tion approaches inappropriate for IoT platforms [2], [3] [4].
The decentralized security and privacy on IoT applications
can be facilitated by blockchain technology but conventional
blockchain approaches have significant energy consumption,
latency and execution overhead which are improper for most
resource budgeted IoT platforms.
This research exploration studies how the blockchain be-
comes lightweight and suitable for IoT based smart city
applications [5] with smart ML based access control. The
authors in [6] reported a decentralized capability based access
control approach to control access of sensitive information.
This proposed method has high latency and overhead and
also compromised with user privacy. In [7], the authors used
TLS and IPSec protocols for sensor data authentication and
privacy but these approaches are very resource expensive for
IoT platform. In [8], Ukil et. al reported a privacy management
system which quantifies the risk of disclosing data to others.
However, in many situations, the perceived benefit of IoT ap-
plications made the risk of privacy loss more significant. Hence
it finds an obvious requirement of privacy-aware sharing of IoT
sensor/output data without compromising the privacy of users.
Though the works [6] - [8] talked about decentralization and
privacy issues but they did not adopt blockchain and efficient
access control management in their architecture. The works
in [9], [10], [11] and there are also a few more works which
were conducted in early years where authors stated about the
different types of efficient access control mechanisms but they
did not use full-fledged blockchain technology in their IoT
platform. Liu et. al [9] proposed a role based access control
system where roles indicate administrator and guest which
are subjected to entities that access various resources within
an organization. The associated roles with different access
rights like read, write, execute are granted to IoT nodes. This
role based access control schemes establish a many-to-many
relations between the access rights and the nodes. In [10],
the authors proposed an access control which is based on
policies and it combines different types of attributes, like node
attributes, objects like nodes that holds resources attributes
etc. All these attributes set certain conditions for access rights
grants to nodes. Both [9] and [10] validate access rights
of nodes that are usually performed by a centralized entity
which implies an issue of single point of failure. Frey et al.
[11] have proposed capability based access control method
where the access permission validation is conducted by the
requested IoT nodes instead of a centralized HP entity but
IoT nodes usually have low resources. Hence it may be easily
compromised by attackers. The authors in [12], [13], [14] have
implemented smart contract using blockchain technology to
achieve distributed trust and privacy of IoT platform. Addi-
tionally blockchain utilizes resources of all participating nodes
to address scalability and robustness which decrease many-to-
one traffic flows. As a result it solves the issue of single point
failure and delay issues. The inherent anonymity of blockchain
is appropriate for IoT applications where the identity of the
users is kept private. Blockchain technology serves a trustful
network over dishonest nodes which is appropriate in IoT
platforms where huge number of heterogeneous devices are
interconnected. On the other-hand, straight forward adoption
of blockchain in IoT is not possible due to certain constraints
of IoT architecture.
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2Alidori et. al [12] proposed an access control feature in
an IoT platform with cloud storage, service providers, user
devices, local storage and smart homes where each consists of
a miner and multiple IoT nodes. Each home controls a private
local blockchain with a policy header. The policy header
controls all the access requests related to the home. It has been
observed that [12] serves distributed and immutable storage
for access control policies which wasted the capability of the
blockchain. The authors of [13] proposed a smart contract-
based access control framework, which has multiple access
control contracts, one register contract and one judge contract.
This framework was proposed to attain distributed and trust-
worthy access control for IoT applications. This proposal talks
about access control algorithm which grants the permission of
subject (sender) and object(receiver) by checking its access
control header and charges a blocking time as a penalty if
any time related inconsistency is detected. We have noticed
several cases where time inconsistency did not occur due to
attack of malicious node. Time inconsistency may also take
place due to network congestion or for several other reasons.
In [13], these false positive cases may charge unnecessary
penalty. Authors of [13] also overlooked other inconsistencies
which may significantly affect IoT platform. Article [14]
proposes an access control, where the blockchain plays the
key role of a decentralized access control management. The
[14] used a tokens to represent access rights. The sender
pads access control permissions into the locked scripts of
the transaction. The receiver unlocks the locking scripts to
prove the possession of the token. This scheme granted node’s
access by receiving a token, and it grant access rights to
another node by delivering a token. The expensive computing
requirement of locking scripts made the inefficient for access
control management.
To address the limitations of the aforementioned works, this
work proposes a smart city architecture which uses blockchain
technology for distributed trust and privacy. The architecture
also adopts a smart and efficient access control technique
which considers all realistic inconsistencies of IoT platforms.
This work proposes three main parts, namely smart block,
canopy and storage. A city can be partitioned into several
smart blocks. All Smart blocks are equipped with sensors and
outputs to collect and distribute real-time data according to
the policy stated in access control header. The canopy network
consists of smart blocks such as admin miners, administration
authorities such as local police station, municipalities etc. The
cloud storage is required to share data between smart blocks
and others central/states administration etc. The transactions
of different types of blockchains take place depending on
its network hierarchy. The merit of this research proposal
is to adopt blockchain based IoT architecture with efficient
access control management which is lightweight in terms
of computation and resource usage to delivers decentralized
security and privacy. The main contributions of this proposal
are given as follows:
• The proposed IoT based blockchain platform has two
level of network hierarchy where the 1st hierarchy level
consists LP nodes (Local Network) and its admin named
as block admin and the 2nd hierarchy level (canopy
network) consists of block admin and other high pro-
cessing computers belonging to either same or different
group. Both the hierarchies can handle all the privacy and
security threats. The adoption of lightweight security such
as symmetric key cryptography for the 1st hierarchy level
makes the 1st hierarchy more efficient in terms of latency
and resource budget. The 1st and 2nd hierarchy level
blocks also achieve a fundamental security features such
as confidentiality, integrity and availability, authenticity
and non repudiation.
• The proposed smart access control header controls all
the honest transactions by restricting the malicious read
write transaction requests. Any malicious activity termed
as an inconsistency can be detected as data, network and
time inconsistency. For data inconsistency detection, we
have used Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence machine
learning algorithm.
• The automated code generation for LP node and HP
node make the system user friendly. The repeated LP
code download process using Over The Air (OTA) [15]
protocol prevents execution of malicious LP node code
for long term scenario. Block admin generates hash of
the code of LP nodes to detect code alteration attack.
• The proposed IoT architecture is also appropriate for
smart agriculture and smart home applications which can
result in fast, secured and efficient public governance
system .
The organization of the article is stated below. Sec. II states
the architecture of the proposed system. The work flow of
the architecture is described in sec. III. Auto code generator
algorithm and smart contract framework are stated in sec. IV
& sec. V respectively. Result, implementation and conclusion
are organized in sec. V and VI respectively
II. ARCHITECTURE
The proposed architecture is divided into 3 different parts,
such as smart block, canopy network and storage. The descrip-
tion of three parts are stated below.
A. Smart Block
A city is partitioned into small blocks which are labelled as
smart block. Each smart block owns variety of sensors like
camera, weather station sensor, thermostat, health structure
sensor, LDR etc as mentioned in table I.
TABLE I: Services in Proposed Smart City
Service Communication Tolerable BC Remarks
Name Rate/node Latency
GPS 1 pkt per 30 min The node location is verified
30 min in each 30 minutes
Health 1 pkt per 30 min To check health condition
Structure 10 min of bridge and multi-storage
Weather On 1 min It measures temperature,
Station Demand humidity and pressure
Air 1 pkt per 5 min green house sensors
Quality 30 min will be used
Smart On 1 min Lights through out
Light Demand city can be automated
Camera On On e.g. the number of
demand Demand can be counted
Traffic 1 pkt per On The counted car adjust
Light 30 min Demand time slot of traffic light
3All the mentioned sensors and outputs are installed in
LP nodes and the block admin has lawful access to all
sensor and output data of these smart LP nodes. A private
blockchain along with an optional local storage is maintained
by block admin to store various informations generated from
LP nodes. Unlike the bitcoin’s blockchain whose control is
decentralized, here the local BC is managed centrally by its
block admin. All the transactions from or to the nodes are
chained together by the block admin. The block admin is
solely responsible for adding new LP nodes or removing an
existing LP node. The addition of new LP node is similar to
’create coin’ transaction in bitcoin [16]. There is an access
control header owned by block admin to control all the
transactions occurring in its block. Shared key using the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange algorithm [17] permits all the transac-
tions in this platform. The proposed private blockchain used
in this architecture avoids Proof of Work (PoW) to reduce the
associated overheads. The nodes pad a pointer to the previous
blocked copies of the policy in the previous block header to the
next new block and chains the block to the blockchain. Unlike
the bitcoin technology all the transactions are treated as honest
transactions, whether the block is mined or not. The private
blockchain is designed not only for user authentication purpose
but also for mutual authentication between nodes, generating
and securely storing operation details and outline-based IoT
contracts.
B. Canopy Network
This network is a peer to peer network which accommodates
smart HP blocks like local police stations or state public
administrative bodies. HP nodes in the canopy network are
grouped in clusters and each group elects a Group Head
(GH) to reduce the network overhead. Each GH controls a
public blockchain. The GHs owns the list of public key of
requesters who are permitted to access data for the smart
blocks connected with this group. The GHs maintain public
keys of respondents of nodes connected to that group which is
allowed to be accessed. It is to be noted that the block admin
control its own private blockchain and block admin is also a
node of public blockchain mounted in canopy network.
C. Cloud
The cloud may also be a member of GH. In some appli-
cations, LP nodes of the smart block may want to store its
data in the cloud storage. Those data should be accessed by
the third party to provide certain services to the LP nodes.
For example, in the federal structure of a country like India,
few other state organizations or few central organizations want
to access the data of LP nodes, they can read or in certain
cases can write those through cloud. All the transactions in
LP nodes and canopy nodes are tagged as transactions. Four
types of transactions may occur in this proposed platform. If
the LP nodes of a smart block store data in the local storage of
block admin or in the cloud, it is termed as write transaction.
The read transaction will be coined if other states/central
organization or block admin from same group or different
group want to monitor cloud data or LP node data. Addition of
a new node to the smart block is done by a genesis transaction
and a device is removed by a remove transaction. It is to be
noted that all the transactions to or from the smart block will
be stored in the local blockchain. All the above transactions
use shared key to encrypt their data. The data integrity of
data is managed by lightweight hashing technique [18]. On
a simpler note, it can be stated that the whole architecture
is partitioned into two hierarchies such as 1st level network
hierarchy where private blockchain is running and 2nd level
network hierarchy where public blockchain is functional. The
1st hierarchy consists of LP-HP nodes and the 2nd hierarchy
consists of HP-HP nodes. As shown in figure 2:a, the interfaces
of these two hierarchies are done by Block Admin. All the
transactions of these two hierarchies are mostly identical. The
pictorial representation of proposed smart city architecture
including smart block, canopy network and cloud storage are
detailed in fig. 1.
III. WORK FLOW OF ARCHITECTURE
The work flow of the proposed architecture consists of two
main parts. In initialization process, the pre-requisitions of LP
platform (LP) is configured. The tables of databases of HP
node such as block admin and group head are configured in
initialization process. In the transaction process, it can be seen
how the actual data is moved through the local and canopy
network.
A. Initialization
The proposed model is involved with 2 types of initialization
processes; intitialization of low processing (LP) platform and
initialization of high processing (HP) nodes in block admin
or in canopy network.
1) Low Processing (LP) Initialization: Let us assume that
n1 sensors and n2 output interfaces are connected with each
LP node and total number of LP nodes under one block admin
is m. Each LP node can collect data from n1 number of
sensors and can feed data to n2 number of outputs. Each LP
node has one device id or node id and three keys such as public
key, private key and a key for symmetric key encryption. The
LP nodes and block admin share light weight symmetric key
[18]. The hash of public key represents node id of LP nodes
which is very similar to the bitcoin platform where account
id is also generated from hash value of its public key. The
property of hash assured that hash of any random number is
also unique [19].
2) High Processing (HP) Initialization: The collected data
from n1 number of sensors are encrypted by each LP node and
forwarded to the HP nodes using light weight cryptography
algorithm [18]. The HP nodes accept encrypted data and check
sender LP node’s id, list of public keys, sensor id, transaction
type, access control header, time stamps and hash values. If
all of these checking processes are successful, the transaction
will be accepted and copy of the transaction is stored in the
private blockchain of block admin which may synchronized
to public blockchain later. Two types of HP nodes are proposed
in this report such as block admin and users in 1st network
layer hierarchy and group head in canopy network or 2nd
network layer hierarchy. All the transactions are stored in the
4Fig. 1: Architecture of Smart City
local blockchain of block admin. The public blockchain of
group head might log transactions in certain cases. During
the addition of new nodes the block admin and group head
both store the access control header and the list of public
keys connected with that high processing nodes.
B. Transaction
Three types of transactions are available in this pro-
posed architecture namely, add node, remove node and
data movement.
1) Add Node: The 1st network hierarchy has three types
of AddNode transactions, such as :
i. New LP node addition under block admin supervision.
ii.New users (HP Node) under the group head supervision.
iii. New block admin (HP Node) under the group head
supervision.
As shown by ash colour in Fig. 2, the new addition of LP
node with block admin incorporates the below sub-steps:
The add device transaction is similar to genesis transaction
of bit coin [16]. The AddNode transaction process of LP
generates one public key and one private key. The public key
is publicly available and it is inserted in a new blockchain.
As suggested by many crypto mathematicians, all the LP
and HP nodes of our proposed model use public key for
its real world identity [19]. But large size of the public key
makes it unsuitable for node identity. Hence, the hash value
of public key is used as a unique node identity. The private
key is kept privately and it is used to sign messages. After the
addition of new LP node, sensors and their output interfaces
are connected with different LP pins. As the pins connected
with LP nodes are unique locally and the previously generated
LP node identity is also unique, the concatenated value of both
LP nodes’ pin and LP nodes’ identity are collectively used to
generate the sensor/output ID. The new Add Node operation
also creates an access control header for all the connected
sensors and outputs.
Both the new users HP nodes and the new block admin
under the group head supervision have transactions similar to
previous LP node addition under block admin supervision. It
follows the bitcoin account creation process along with the
access control as mentioned earlier in this work. The ash
colour part of Fig. 2 shows the subsequent process of add node
transaction in 1st level network hierarchy. The first step of
add node transaction create a pair of key; a public key and a
private key. The private key is kept secret and public key is
added to private blockchain of block admin and public block
chain of group head. This indicates that the all HP nodes that
belong to the group get informed about the newly added LP
node. The same process will generate a node id which is hash
value of its public key. In the second step, different sensors
and outputs are added with the said LP node. Each sensor and
outputs are connected with a unique pin of LP node. Hence,
the sensors/outputs id is the concatenated value of local LP
pin and the LP node id generated from the hash value of its
public key. Say for an example a light sensor is connected
with A0 pin of a LP node whose node is 1234567890abcdef .
The id of that light sensor will be 1234567890abcdefA0.
When the sensors and the outputs are fixed for a specific LP
node, Algorithm 1 can generate the node code which will be
downloaded in memory of LP node remotely using Over The
Air (OTA) protocol facility [15]. The ash coloured steps 1
and 2 of Fig. 2 show the add node transaction in the 1st level
network hierarchy.
2) Remove Node: The remove node transaction will de-
stroy the said public key from the public key list of its
supervisor, and keeping the chain alive in blockchain. The
remove node transaction can occur at LP node, block admin
and group Head. After remove node transaction LP node,
block admin and group Head respectively can not read
or write data from/to block admin, group Head and other
group Head of canopy network.
3) Data Movement: The proposed architecture consists of
two types of data movements which are described below:
5i. LP nodes to Block Admin: At 1st level of network
hierarchy LP nodes can write sensor data to the block admin
and outputs of LP node can read data from the block admin.
It is to be noted that sensor data writing to block admin
is the reading process of block admin from sensors in LP
nodes and reading process by outputs is writing process by
block admin to the outputs. For example, say a camera is a
sensor and traffic lights are the outputs and both are connected
with same or different LP nodes. Camera is sending videos
to its block admin and block admin calculates the number
of cars passing through particular lane where the camera is
installed (low processing node to block admin). According to
the number of cars, the duration of the traffic light of the said
lane is changed dynamically (block admin to low processing
end).
As per Fig. 2, after completion of ash coloured step 1 and
2, the data movement process will start. After generation of
node code using OTA protocol, block admin can periodically
configure node code on the specific node. If any attacker
tries to modify the node code of any LP node, it will be
erased and reconfigured with original code due to the periodic
intervention of block admin. The OTA protocol sends the
encrypted code to the LP node. During this transmission
block admin generates a one time key (OTK). This OTK is
generated by a hash based on morkel tree on the private key
of a LP node and a random number. In the fifth step, the LP
nodes are configured and they generate three hash values such
as key hash KHash, sensor data hash DHash and a final
hash FHash, where KHash = hash(OTK+prehash).Here
prehash is zero for the first data packet and for the other
data packets prehash = Hash(prehash + time + data +
error message). DHash is hash of all sensor data and
FHash = Hash(Khash + Dhash). At the 6th step, LP
nodes encrypt the sensor data and construct a packet with six
parameters: encrypted sensor data, FHash, LP node IP, Node
ID, packet sequence number and access control header. After
that this packet will be sent to Block Admin. At the 8th
step the Block admin will receive the packet followed by
a decryption process. The Block Admin computes DHash
from that decrypted data. The prehash is computed by
Block Admin itself, hence this value is already available
at the Block Admin side. Khash will be computed from
OTK and prehash. The final hash FHash is also computed
from DHash and KHash. If the computed FHash by
Block Admin matches with the sent FHash by LP, the
sensor data will be accepted in the blockchain data base which
may be later accessed by other HP nodes of same or different
group. If both the FHash match, a new prehash will be
generated and sent to the LP node. Else, the data packet will
be discarded and Block admin will ask for a new packet. The
whole transaction is shown by ash colour in fig. 2.
ii. Block Admin to Group Head: After the authenticated
permission the HP nodes/members from different group or
from the same group can access the data of sensors and
output interfaces of Block Admin. As shown in black colour
of Fig. 2, if HP nodes of same group or different group
want to access some specific sensors/outputs, they send a
packet consisting of sensors/outputs ID, requester member ID,
signature of requester, IP of requester member and its access
control. The group head will check the signature and access
control. If it matches, access will be granted to the specific
sensor data of the LP node, otherwise the situation will be
ignored by group head. For example, video captured by a
camera need to be written in block admin to be monitored by
some state government or central government agencies through
group head or some other nodes from different groups. Let
us say that a traffic signal which is connected as output in
some LP nodes changes its timings dynamically according to
the vehicle load as calculated from the captured video stored
earlier in block admin. In this example, storing video in
block admin as captured by the camera is a writing process
to block admin by camera sensor connected in LP node at
first level of network hierarchy. The changes of traffic light
timings is a reading process by traffic light outputs connected
in LP node from block admin. The two hierarchy transactions
are shown in fig. 2:a.
C. Packet
In the 1st network hierarchy, all the packets travel from LP
node to HP node or HP node to LP node. In the 2nd network
hierarchy, all the packets travel from HP of same or different
group to Block admin or Block admin to HP of same or
different group. The packet configuration is shown in Fig. 3.
The components inside the packet are stated below.
1) Symmetric Encryption on Data: Data collected from n1
number of sensors in LP node is encrypted by symmetric key
encryption technique. The key for symmetric key encryption
algorithm is shared by block admin HP using Diffie-Hellman
algorithm [20]. The encryption on sensor data is a mandatory
process throughout the sensor data communication from LP
to Block Admin or Block Admin to HP nodes of same or
different group.
2) Hash of Data: LP nodes to Block Admin and
Block Admin to the HP nodes of the same or different
group both use hash on data to serve the data integrity. In the
1st network hierarchy, the final FHash depends on DHash
where DHash is the hash of sensor data. The same process is
also followed in 2nd level of network hierarchy. The hash in
1st level network hierarchy uses light weight hash algorithm.
3) Digital Signature: LP nodes to Block Admin and
Block Admin to the HP nodes of same or different group
both use signature on data to serve the data availability and
authenticity. In the 1st network hierarchy, the final FHash
depends on KHash where KHash depends on a function of
private key. As the private key is secret, no one can generate
the appropriate KHash hence signature can not be forged.
It is to be noted that in the 1st level network hierarchy
conventional signature verification algorithm has not been used
because signature verification algorithm consumes enormous
processor footprint and its throughput is very less which makes
it inappropriate for such low processing platform. As all the
nodes in the 2nd level network hierarchy are high processing
platform, hence they use conventional signature verification
process during their data transaction.
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4) Access Control Header (ACH): The access controller
header consists of all the possible read/write permissions
in different storage devices. The LPs have different sensors
which are generally written in local storage of block admin
or cloud storage in canopy network. LPs also consist of
few outputs which may read data from the local storage of
block admin. For certain applications, different sensors may
need different permissions. In Fig. 3 sensor : 0 of device : 0
has reading permission
5) Other Data: The said packet also consists of time stamp,
sensor id, device id (LP id).
IV. AUTO CODE GENERATOR
The proposed design can generate codes for LP and HP
nodes. The auto code generation for LP is a very crucial
step because the block admin need to aware about the code
running in LP to protect LP from malicious code injection.
The auto code generation in HP side is also an important issue
because the changes of existing code or creation of new code
blockchain technology should be accepted after the distributed
consensus of other HP nodes.
A. Code Generator Algorithm for LP
While sensors are being added in LP, the Block Admin can
generate LP code automatically by AutoLPCode generator
algorithm. IoT devices are considered as nodes which are
denoted by expression Ni, where i is any positive integer from
1 to I . Each node has several sensors and outputs which are
denoted by Sj and Ok respectively. j and k are any positive
integers which vary from 1 to J and from 1 to K respectively.
The system code Ci of existing IoT node has 6 sections as
given below:
1) Static Node libraries: The IoT node libraries SNL is
needed for crypto applications and other network components
of IoT device. The SNL is not dependent on the type of IoT
node. Like WiFi client libraries, MD5Builder and other crypto
library may work with almost all the type of IoT nodes.
2) Dynamic Node Libraries: The dynamic node libraries
DNL depends on board type, once the board type is changed
the dynamic node library expression is changed. Hence the
DNL can be stated by Eq. 1 where DNLi is node function
(fni ) of Ni node.
DNLi = fn(Ni); (1)
For example, the web server library for esp32 and esp8266
use different packages.
3) Dynamic Libraries for Sensors: Dynamic libraries of
sensors are denoted by DSLSj which depends on sensors fsj
connected with nodes. The sensor function fsj depends on the
type of sensor tj and the connected pin pj . For J number of
sensors, DSLSj can be expressed by Eq. 2. It is to be noted
that DSLSj is independent of node Ni.
DSLSj = fDSL(
J⋃
j=1
fsj(pj , tj)); (2)
4) Pins and Objects: Pins and objects (if needed) POSjOk
of sensors and outputs are sensor function fsj and output
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Algorithm 1 Auto LP Code Algorithm Structure
1: procedure Input(i,
⋃J
j=1 pj , tj ,
⋃K
k=1(pk, tk))
2: SNL
3: DNLi
4: for j = 1→ J do
5: fDSL(fsj(pj , tj))
6: end for
7: for j = 1→ J do
8: fpo(fsj(pj , tj))
9: end for
10: for k = 1→ K do
11: fpo(fsj(pk, tk))
12: end for
13: for j = 1→ J do
14: fsu(
⋃J
j=1 fsj(pj , tj);
15: end for
16: SUN
17: for j = 1→ J do
18: fsj(pj , tj);
19: end for
20: for k = 1→ K do
21: fok(pk, tk);
22: end for
23: for j = 1→ J do
24: fsj(pj , tj);
25: end for
26: for k = 1→ K do
27: fok(pk, tk);
28: end for
29: end procedure
function fok which depend on pj , tj and pk, tk respectively.
The equation of POSjOk is stated in Eq. 3.
POSjOk = fpo(
J⋃
j=1
fsj(pj , tj),
K⋃
k=1
fok(pk, tk)); (3)
5) Set up function: The setup function consists of two parts;
one part is static for boards and network application which is
denoted by SUN and other part SUsj is for sensors. The
expression of SU can be stated by Eq. 4.
SU = fsu(
J⋃
j=1
fsj(pj , tj),+SUN); (4)
6) Data packet: Data packet DPSj generation for sensors
Sj and receiving packet RPOk construction for outputs Ok
are very important for IoT platforms. The expression of data
packet DP can be stated by Eq. 5.
DPSjOk = fdp(
J⋃
j=1
fsj(pj , tj),
K⋃
k=1
fok(pk, tk)); (5)
7) Delay: The delay Dso for sensors and outputs are given
by the users. Depending on the application and sensor data, the
delay may be varied. The expression of delay can be expressed
by Eq. 6.
DSjOk = fdp(
J⋃
j=1
fsj(pj , tj),
K⋃
k=1
fok(pk, tk)); (6)
The final system code ci of Ni node will be the function
(fc) of all the aforementioned six parameters. The expression
of final code can be stated by Eq. 7.
ci = fc(SNL,DNLi, fDSL(
J⋃
j=1
fsj(pj , tj)),
fpo(
J⋃
j=1
fsj(pj , tj),
K⋃
k=1
fok(pk, tk)), fsu(
J⋃
j=1
fsj(pj , tj),
+ SUN, fdp(
J⋃
j=1
fsj(pj , tj),
K⋃
k=1
fok(pk, tk)),
fdp(
J⋃
j=1
fsj(pj , tj),
K⋃
k=1
fok(pk, tk)));
(7)
B. Code Generator Algorithm for HP
In every Block Admin, there should be a code to receive
sensor data or to send data to outputs. For each sensor and
8output there will a separate HP code running in Block Admin.
If there are n1 number of sensors and n2 number of outputs are
connected in each LP node and the total number of LP nodes
under a Block Admin is l, then the number of HP codes to
receive sensor data and to send output data is l×(n1+n2). The
different parts of the HP code are stated below sequentially.
1) This part of the code receives all the parameters sent
by LP node. The details of all these parameters are
discussed in Section III-B.
2) Block Admin generates the time of the data receipt.
It is to be noted that the time stamp can be generated
in LP node itself and can be sent as a parameter. The
implementation experience suggests that the generation
of timestamp in LP node is an extra overhead and it does
not matter if we consider the Block Admin’s receiving
time as a time stamp of the data. Additionally reducing
the number of parameter reduces the Internet traffic.
3) Extract private key using the LP node id to generate the
One Time Key (OTK).
4) Generate KHash from OTK and prehash. Generate
DHash after decrypting the encrypted by its symmetric
key.
5) Check FHash and decide for the acceptance of data.
6) Generate prehash for next data.
TABLE II: Features Table
Security Issues Proposed Solution
Confidentiality Symmetric Key encryption used for all transaction
Integrity All transaction consist hash.
Availability The access controller header of local and canopy network ensuring that
all systems services are available, when requested by an authorized user.
Authentication It is achieved by using access header and shared keys.
Nonrepudiation All local and canopy transactions are signed by the
transaction generator to achieve non-repudiation. Additionally, Hence
neither requester nor requestee can deny their complicity in a transaction
V. SMART CONTRACT FRAMEWORK
As shown in Fig. 3, every node will have access control
header (ACH) which defines reading and writing permissions
of every sensor/output connected with LP nodes. Before grant-
ing any transaction in any network hierarchy of this proposed
model signature, access control header and POW (optional in
private BC) verifications are needed. Along with this, also
a parameter in percentage format named as probability of
misbehaviour (PM) is calculated. According to the percentage
of PM, the specific node will be charged a penalty that is, the
said node might be blocked by the respondent for a certain
period of time. To measure the PM, we have incorporated the
below three inconsistency parameters.
A. Time Inconsistency
1) Minimum Frequency: The minimum frequency
(minFreq) of sensor/output is the minimum permissible
time interval between two successive transaction requests. In
runtime, the smart contract algorithm (SMA) calculates the
time interval between two successive transaction requests; if
it is less than minFreq the latter transaction request will be
treated as a frequent request.
2) The Number of Frequent Transaction Requests(NoFTR):
The access control header will store a cut-off for each sen-
sor/output. If the number of frequent transaction requests
(NoFTR) is larger than or equal to the cut-off, the SMA detects
a misbehaviour occurrence.
3) Time of last Transaction (ToLT): : the time of the last
access transaction from the sensor.
4) Time Stamp: This is the time when the sensor data from
LP node is received in Block Admin. The details of the
timestamp is discussed in section IV-B. To check the time
inconsistency the following steps are considered:
• Access control header will be checked against the sent
sensor id.
• The subtracted value of ToLT from timestamp is the run
time interval between two successive transaction requests.
If it is less that minFreq, NoFTR will be increased
by 1. If NoFTR reaches a certain threshold, the said
node will be considered compromised under the time
inconsistency issue.
B. Data Inconsistency
The proposed application uses two types of data inconsis-
tency detection. The first one is data inconsistency detection
based on Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence (centralised
detection) and the second stage detects data inconsistency
based on mean distance on sensor data from neighbour sensor
nodes (distributed detection).
1) Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence on Centralized
Sensor node: Dempster-Shafer evidence theory [21],[22] is
used to address the uncertainty in statistical conclusions.
Statistical inference includes all the possible states of a system
which are generally termed as hypotheses. These hypotheses
are then assigned mass functions based on which some de-
ductions are made. Dempster-Shafer evidence theory helps in
data fusion of different sensor data by applying the said mass
functions. Usually, a single mass function is used to represent
a single data source. But to reach a conclusive decision based
on sensor data fusion, it is necessary to have a cumulative
value. This problem is addressed by Dempster’s combination
rule, which is given by:
m1 ⊕m2(Z) =
∑
X∩Y=Z 6=φm1(X)m2(Y )
1−K (8)
Here, K =
∑
X∩Y=φm1(X)m2(Y ) and X,Y, Z ⊆ Θ. ⊕ is
the orthogonal or direct sum. So, m1⊕m2(Z) is the combined
evidence of two different mass assignments and φ is the null
set. The numerator in (8) covers all the possibilities whose
intersection is X ∩ Y = Z. To normalise this value, it is
divided by 1 − K which represents all the combined values
that produces a null set. Dempster’s rule of combination is
iteratively applied on all the information sources to produce
the final result.
In this work, it is assumed that the data is normally
distributed. One of the primary reasons for this assumption
is that the data set is sufficiently large which is an inherent
property of a data set to have normal distribution. Now that
the data distribution is taken care of, a very important part
9TABLE III: Threat & Defence
Name of Definition Defence Tolerance Sustenance
Attack
Denial of Service
(DoS)
Attacker attacks local canopy network node with
a huge number of transactions to flood out the
node such that it cannot commit any genuine tr-
-ansactions from other nodes.
Nodes in canopy and local network could not send a (seeIII-B3)
transaction to its group members unless its key finds a match in
their keylist. As stated in sec. V-A each nodes in canopy and
local network have a threshold of transaction rate. If it exceeds
threshold, a penalty will be charged.
Very High Unlikely
Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS)
The distributed version of the DoS attack, where
multiple local or canopy nodes are compromised.
The nodes in canopy and local network are not diretcly accessible.
The key list restricted unautheticated nodes. The nodes in under
local or canopy network can read or write data of other nodes if
key has been shared (see III-B3 & III-B)
High Unlikely
Injection
node
Attacker injects fake nodes into network to
get access to private data
The injected node is isolated as local networks require shared
key, which needs approval from the block admin (see II-A) Moderate Possible
Appending Attacker attacks canopy and local network gene-
-rates fake transactions to create false reputation
Block Admin & Group head can detect malicious nodes
during the signature verification step (see V and III-C3.) Very High Unlikely
Consensus Period
Attack
Attacker attacks canopy and generates fake
transactions to create false reputation
Transaction will be valid, if at least half the number
of nodes will sign. This possibilities is very low.
High Unlikely
Dropping
Attack
The Group Head does not response transactions
to or from its group members, hence nodes are
isolate them from the canopy
A group member can alter its group head if it
notices that its transactions process is failed. High Unlikely
Linking
Attack
Attacker as service provider or cloud storage adds
multiple transactions in the BC with the same identity
to get the real world identity of an anonymous node
The nodes in canopy use unique public key for each
transaction. This restricts the attacker from linking
the data of multiple nodes of the same user.
Very High Unlikely
Routing
Attack
Transactions propagating through
the local or canopy network and
tampering with them before passing
It uses hashing in local and canopy network(see IV-B) Very High Unlikely
is designing the mass function. For determining the state of
a sensor to be either faulty or normal at a primary level, the
following mass function is designed:
mλ(δ) =
ρλ(δ)∑
δ ρλ(δ)
(9)
where, ρλ(δ) is the probability density function and is given
as:
ρλ(δ) =
1√
2piσ2δλ
exp−
(xtλ − µδλ)2
2σ2δλ
(10)
The notations as given in Eq. 9 are as follows:
• σδλ : Standard deviation of the training set for the feature
λ in class δ
• µδλ : Expectation of the training set for the feature λ in
class δ
• xtλ : Value of feature λ of the test vector xt
After mλ(δ) is calculated, the mass functions are combined
according to Eq. 9. Then the conclusion is based on the
combination rule which states that if the combined mass
assignment for normal sensor is greater than the combined
mass assignment for faulty sensor, then the sensor is normal,
else the said sensor will be considered compromised in-terms
of data inconsistency under centralized consensus. The details
of this work is reported in our previous work [23].
2) Distance Neighbour Mean on Distributed Sensor Node:
It calculates data inconsistency based on mean data distance
form a given node to its neighbour node. If that Distance
Neighbour Mean (DNM) exceeds certain given threshold, the
sensor node will be considered to be faulty. The GPS sensor
provides the latitude and longitude of the LP node. If xi and
yi are the latitude and longitude of the given ith LP node,
we configure a virtual square window of s arm around the
coordinate xi and yi. The four coordinates of the square will
be (xi−s/2, yi+s/2), (xi+s/2, yi+s/2), (xi−s/2, yi−s/2)
and (xi + s/2, yi − s/2). We will calculate mean of distance
from ith LP node to all the node coordinates under this virtual
square. Say, we have n1 temperature sensors connected with
n1 LP nodes inside the said square. The DNM of temperature
sensor of ith node will be calculated by Eq. 11 where t is
the temperature of the ith LP node and tj is the combined
temperature of the surrounding LP nodes, where j varies from
1 to n1− 1.
DNMi =
n1−1∑
j=1
|t− tj | (11)
If the DNM exceeds a given threshold, the temperature sensor
of ith LP node will be considered compromised in terms of
data inconsistency under distributed consensus.
C. Network Inconsistency
As discussed in Section III-B3, the decrypted sensor data
will be accepted in BC ledger when FHash is matched.
This process covers all the cryptographic issues as discussed
in Table II. Fhash will not match if any crypto process is
compromised by an intended attacker putting inconsistency
in the network part. The malfunction might also occur due
to technology failure. Both these situations are considered as
network inconsistency. Any FHash mismatching indicates
that the node is compromised due to network inconsistency.
FHash matching is considered as database hit, else it is a
database miss. We compute a ratio of database hit and database
miss (database hit+database miss) to measure the reliability of
the given LP node. The threat models of the proposed article
is discussed in Table III.
VI. RESULTS AND IMPLEMENTATION
The proposed architecture uses Node MCU as LP which
is connected with five sensors such as temperature, humid-
ity, pressure, camera, IR and light intensity. DHT11 sensor
is used for humidity and temperature measurement. BMP
180, flying fish and LDR are used as pressure sensor,
IR and Light Detecting Resistance (LDR) respectively. The
ArduCAMMinimodule is used as camera. Conventional
8GB RAM computer with and i7 processor is used as
block admin. The private blockchain, access control header,
public key list of LP in 1st level hierarchy are stored in
mysql database. The APIs of local network are written in PHP
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to extract all the required informations from the transaction
packets. The Canopy network is design in Etherium platform.
Table II ensures that the five primitives of cryptography
such as confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, availability and
repudiation are managed. In Table IV, the reported architecture
is compared with the existing bit coin architecture [16], [13],
[14] and a recent bench mark implementation [12]. The article
[12] is the most popular and the most cited blockchain based
IoT implementation in existing literature. Our work has found
seven major changes over the [12] and other existing literature
as shown in of Table IV marked in gray. The 3rd row of Table
IV states about the Miner Joining Overhead which is the
most profound issue of blockchain architecture.
In existing blockchain of bitcoin [16], [14], [13] and Ali
Dori et al. [12], the newly joined miner needs to download
all the blockchain of the previous transactions. The proposed
work also downloads all the previous transactions in current
blockchain and additionally it includes the public key of the
newly joined user into a separate private blockchain. As per
section III-A1, it is to be noted that for newly joined LP it
does not have such downloading overheads. This blockchain
of the public keys of block admin stores all the public keys of
the authorized HP users and LP. Any inclusion or exclusion of
HP/LP nodes in this blockchain is tracked cryptographically.
The adoption of the BC technology to store public keys of de-
vices avoids situations where malicious devices can steal net-
work password and connect with block admin. The absence of
public key of malicious device in public key blockchain blocks
that device from transaction of any packets. This scheme
prevents device injection attack. appending attack, DoS and
DDoS attack in local and canopy networks as stated in Table
III. The group head and other HP nodes in canopy network
always validate each new transaction that it receives from other
group head before to appending it to the public BC. The
validation process consists signature verification process. It
is to be noted that each group head and other HP nodes in
canopy use a pre-shared public key for generating transactions
and it is assumed that these public keys are shared to all
other group head and other HP nodes in canopy which makes
the architecture safe from appending attack. The 8th row of
Table IV shows that block header architecture is different for
all existing architecture. The 9th row of table IV shows that
our architecture uses encryption in local and canopy network
where as [12] used encryption only the overlay network. Other
literatures such that [16],[14] and [13] does not have such
types of local and overlay network. Hash puzzle and policy
header are used article [16] and [12] respectively where as we
use an access control process on block header. The 13th row
of Table IV shows that malicious user can participate [16],
[14], [13] and local BC of [12] which is considerably tough
in our local BC because of the schemes stated in section V.
The rejection of malicious users as stated in section V ensures
Denial of Service (DoS) attack is not possible in proposed
article because canopy and local network could not send a
transactions to their group members unless they find a match
in their key-list. The 15th row shows that misbehaviour of
nodes has not studied in [12] and [16] where as [13],[14] and
our proposal put significant focus on this relevant issue. To
the best of our knowledge our proposed work is the first BC
based IoT architecture which can generate codes for HP and
LP nodes as stated 16th and 17th rows of table IV.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Standard security protocols are not suitable for IoT ap-
plication due to its immense time-space requirements. This
proposed article modified the architecture of conventional
blockchain technology to adopt it in IoT application. The
automated code generation for block admin and IoT nodes
make the platform user convenient and unique. This architec-
ture preserve authenticity, confidentiality, availability, integrity
and non-repudiation. Several standard attacks such as stated
in TableIII can be prevented by this ML based smart access
controlled blockchain platform used in IoT application. The
comparison with existing literature establishes that the pro-
posed architecture is better in terms security issues.
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